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INTRODUCTION
The trailblazing contribution of William Twining to the broadening of legal education and scholarship has been pivotal, and barely needs 
any introduction. He has served as an exceptional mentor, role model 
and friend to many from Australia to Zimbabwe, been an international 
leader in fields as diverse as jurisprudence (Twining 1973; 2009a), 
evidence (Twining 1985; Twining & Hampsher-Monk 2003; Anderson 
& Ors 2005; Twining 2006), globalization (Twining 2000; 2011) and 
legal education (Twining 1967; 1994b; 1997; 2002; 2018; 2019), and 
an activist reformer and polemicist (Twining 2019). Paradoxically, his 
Twining’s Tower and The Challenges of 
Making law a huManisTiC disCipline
DaviD Sugarman1
Professor Emeritus, Law School, Lancaster University; Senior 
Associate Research Fellow, Institute of Advanced Legal 
Studies, University of London; Senior Associate, Centre for 
Socio-Legal Studies, University of Oxford
Abstract
This article provides a survey of the life and scholarship of 
William Twining, focusing largely on his contribution to the 
broadening of legal education and scholarship. Part I reviews 
his background, personality and education, then explores the 
significance of Africa and his anti-colonialism, the inspiration of 
American legal realism, his teaching in Africa, Belfast, Warwick 
and UCL, his law reform efforts and his scholarly output. Part II 
examines his intellectual hallmarks and his struggle to recast 
law as a humanistic discipline. Part III considers the current 
efficacy of the notion of law as a humanistic discipline with law 
schools as purveyors of humanistic education.  
Keywords: William Twining; legal education; legal biography; 
intellectual history; colonialism; postcolonialism.
1 This article is for Phil Thomas on his 81st birthday. I would like to thank William Twining for 
his helpful comments and Léonie Sugarman, who made valuable points about the way in which this 
article was expressed. All interpretations are mine, unless otherwise indicated.
335Twining’s Tower and the Challenges of Making Law a Humanistic Discipline
Spring 2021
engagement with law and legal education is so eclectic, multilayered but 
seemingly specialized—and in important respects, technical, intellectually 
demanding and occasionally labyrinthine—that it is difficult to gauge 
in the round, especially as his work has evolved and some of his views 
changed over time. Seen in this light, William’s record as an intellectual 
and activist constitutes ‘Twining’s Tower’, analogous to ‘Blackstone’s 
Tower’ the metaphor he used to describe English law schools (Twining 
1994b). 
William has inspired many law students, practitioners and academics, 
myself included, by doggedly and perceptively giving voice to our baffling 
disillusionment with our own legal education, to why so much English 
legal education and scholarship has been overly narrow, unadventurous 
and boring, to why law is important and fascinating, and how it might 
achieve its potential as a humanistic discipline. William’s influential 
inaugural lecture of 1967, ‘Pericles and the Plumber’, animated by these 
concerns (Twining 1967), challenged the prevailing assumption in the UK 
that law was a hermetically sealed discipline, separate from society and 
the operation of law in practice. He further argued that the comparison 
between US and UK legal education was invidious, advocating that some 
American developments should be taken seriously in the UK (cf. Twining 
2019: 219). It was in this context that William sought to rehabilitate 
Karl Llewellyn and the American legal realist movement, specifically their 
efforts, some successful, to treat law in its social context, to study ‘law in 
action’ and to integrate law within the social sciences. This contradicted 
the one-dimensional or inaccurate treatments of American legal realism 
that characterized Anglo-American scholarship at the time—something 
he would develop in more detail subsequently. He championed the idea 
of law as a potentially excellent vehicle for liberal education, and how a 
liberal education is crucial for intending practitioners. He encouraged us 
to ‘look outward’ and incorporate non-legal methodologies and insights 
into our work. 
PART I
A biographical approach will help us to understand William’s longstanding 
effort to challenge the legal orthodoxy and recast law as a humanistic 
discipline. 
William was born in Kampala in 1934 into a middle-class family. He 
spent his first ten years initially in Uganda and then in wartime Mauritius. 
For the subsequent ten years, while his parents remained abroad, he 
was educated in English boarding schools and at Oxford University 
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(Twining 2019: 7-30). His mother had forced her way into medical school 
just after the First World War (Twining 1994a). His father, a distantly 
related member of the Twining tea family, was first an army officer and 
subsequently a colonial civil servant who was knighted in 1949. His highly 
successful career culminated in being appointed governor of Tanganyika 
and becoming one of the first life peers. William stressed that his family 
life differed significantly from what might be assumed from his father’s 
career within the British establishment: ‘I come from a family [who] … on 
the whole … were … not inclined to accept authority’ (Twining 1994a). 
William saw his own anti-authority and anti-regimentation tendencies as 
instinctive rather than political. They were mediated, I would suggest, by 
what I discern to be his early education in diplomatic survival skills: ‘I wasn’t 
rebellious at school … I saw it as a jungle of rather hostile forces in which I 
had to survive and develop techniques of survival …’ (Twining 1994a). 
It was these diplomatic skills, allied to his belief in dialogue, open-
mindedness, inclusivity and pluralism, that would subsequently enable 
him to mobilize and work with people of many different backgrounds and 
beliefs without being labelled as overtly left-wing, communist or radical. 
In terms of background, personality and education, there is a strong 
sense of William’s developing autonomy, aided and abetted by a love of 
reading and a fascination with things intellectual. His relative autonomy 
was allied to the fact that, feeling both an insider and an outsider, he 
experienced a degree of estrangement from his own society and from 
Anglo-American parochialism: ‘I really felt like an expatriot for [much of 
my life] so I never looked at the context of my professional life through 
the eyes of someone who is solely a local’ (Twining 1994a). He continues 
to regard East Africa ‘as an important reference point’ (Twining 1994a). 
In discussing his father, I sensed that William felt he had a lot to live 
up to. After some sharp differences as to William’s future career this was 
eventually resolved: 
Why did I become an academic? It was to get out of the shadow of 
my father … He wanted me to be an administrator ... He was rather 
upset that I got a First which, as it were, opened the door to following 
an academic career. In fact, he once said that it was the worst thing 
that ever happened [to me] ... And the answer was that I would have 
[followed an academic career], but I wouldn’t have thought that I 
could have had one. But … [the First] opened the possibility and I 
grabbed it (Twining 1994a). 
Despite his lengthy separation from his parents, their careers and 
lifestyle nonetheless modelled the importance of public service, and the 
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recognition that professional status carried with it the obligation of civic 
service and noblesse oblige. 
William arrived in Oxford in 1952 to read law with a modest academic 
record, no special interest in the subject and no thought of an academic 
career. He did not enjoy the first two years of his legal studies, in no small 
part because of the dominance of doctrine-only textbooks: 
I was not in the least engaged or interested [in law] until I went to 
Herbert Hart’s lectures and [read] his inaugural … It was … the first 
time that I’d come across something in law that was exciting as ideas 
… Basically, I wanted to return to Africa and do something ... about 
education (Twining 1994a). 
The pull of Africa was underpinned by an anti-colonialism that had 
gripped him since adolescence. As he would subsequently observe: ‘I had 
a colonial childhood, an anti-colonial adolescence, a neo-colonial start to 
my career and a post-colonial middle age’ (Twining 2019: 8; cf. Twining & 
Sugarman 2020: 199-200). 
By 1956 he decided to learn more about jurisprudence and see something 
of the United States before pursuing an academic career teaching law in 
Africa. Following a suggestion from Harry Lawson (Oxford’s Professor of 
Comparative Law and William’s mentor) that he work with an American 
jurist, William secured funding from the University of Chicago to work 
with Karl Llewellyn. William’s year at Chicago (1962-1963) proved pivotal. 
He learned much from Llewellyn’s down-to-earth approach, his concern to 
relate theory and practice, and his emphasis on skills and what lawyers 
do as serious subjects of study. Llewellyn’s anthropological The Cheyenne 
Way (Llewellyn & Hoebel 1941) deepened William’s interest in ‘law jobs’ and 
social and legal rules, while fostering his engagement with legal pluralism. 
Above all, perhaps, William was inspired by Llewellyn’s insistence on 
developing one’s own ideas and beliefs towards something approaching 
a personal ‘whole view’ reflecting Llewellyn’s main realist precept: ‘see it 
fresh, see it whole, see it as it works’ (Twining 2019: 36-37).
Llewellyn and his wife, Sonia Mentschikoff, were ‘the two most important 
people in my professional life’ (Twining 2019: 38). Nonetheless, whilst he 
became a disciple of Llewellyn, and Llewellyn influenced his subsequent 
teaching, William never jettisoned his admiration for, and commitment 
to, Hart and the skills associated with analytical jurisprudence and 
analytical thinking more generally. 
During the late 1950s and 1960s, a cadre of fledgling British law 
teachers, inspired by legal realism and their experience of American or 
other legal education, elected to teach law in Africa, frequently along 
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with American expatriates supported by the Ford Foundation. William 
was one of these. The experience of teaching, researching, writing and 
institution building, alongside grappling with an alien legal system and 
culture, demonstrated that law could only be understood in the light 
of history, culture, politics and economic conditions. This ‘US–African 
moment’ also fostered an interest in legal education and its politics. On 
returning to Britain, these expatriates adapted for British audiences the 
intellectual and pedagogical innovations fashioned for African audiences. 
The broadening of legal education and scholarship in England from 
circa 1965 onwards, and the establishment of a generation of radical 
law schools in the 1970s and beyond, owes much to the North American 
and African experience of several of its leading lights (Sugarman 2011; 
Harrington & Manji 2017; Twining 2019: 39-77; Sugarman 2021).
In 1958 William applied to the law faculty of the University of Khartoum. 
He was appointed to a lectureship, and his three years in Sudan served 
as an important preliminary stage in his apprenticeship as an academic 
lawyer. It challenged what he had learnt and the way he had been taught at 
Oxford, heightened his sensitivity to the importance of context, reinforced 
his fascination with archives, and provided vital space to experiment and 
innovate substantively and pedagogically under the mentorship of Patrick 
Atiyah (Twining 2019: 39-56). 
William moved to Tanzania in 1961, where he helped to establish a 
law school at the new University College in Dar es Salaam (UCD). As 
Acting Dean for 18 months, William relished the opportunity to shape the 
direction of the law school, to experiment with law teaching, to research 
and teach local (customary) law and resolve controversies, not least 
whether the professors should wear their Oxford MA gowns (Twining 
2019: 57-77). Although he found it immensely exciting, managing his 
colleagues was both enjoyable and challenging: 
Inevitably, over time there were tensions between elitism and 
egalitarianism … and between safeguarding security and national 
sovereignty and liberal ideas of the rule of law. … Later … UCD 
became a centre of Marxist critiques of [President] Nyerere’s pragmatic 
socialism … Indeed in one period from 1975 the faculty was sharply 
divided between Marxists and others and there was a rapid turnover 
of staff (Twining 2019: 59).
William left Dar in 1965 to spend six months at Yale Law School, mainly 
working on his book on Llewellyn. And it was there that Robert Stevens 
and William dreamt up a new series of books called ‘Law in Context’ that 
would challenge the ‘expository orthodoxy’ of the ‘doctrinal tradition’ of 
legal writing in England and Wales. They persuaded Weidenfeld & Nicolson 
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to take the series, thereby breaking the near monopoly of law publishing 
then held by Butterworths and Sweet & Maxwell (Twining & Sugarman 
2020: 211-215). In important respects the Law in Context series is a 
product of the ‘US–Africa moment’. In half a century, over a hundred 
books have been published in the series, starting with Patrick Atiyah’s 
pathbreaking, Accidents, Compensation, and the Law (Atiyah 1970). 
In January 1966, William took up the position of Chair of Jurisprudence 
and Head of the Department of Law and Jurisprudence at Queen’s 
University, Belfast, at the exceptionally young age of 31. As luck would 
have it, Queen’s had a four-year undergraduate honours law degree and a 
strong commitment to legal theory. William found himself responsible for 
three compulsory theory courses—an almost unprecedented opportunity 
for a Professor of Jurisprudence. These courses became the main vehicles 
for developing his knowledge, thinking and teaching about jurisprudence 
(Twining 2019: 93-103). The first-year course on juristic technique 
provided an arena for developing ideas about rules, interpretation and 
reasoning that became over time How to Do Things with Rules (with David 
Miers), the first of William’s several important contributions to the ‘skills 
revolution’ in legal education (Twining & Miers 1976). Queen’s also offered 
him the space both to consider ‘What might a legal theorist contribute 
to the project of broadening the study of law from within?’ (Twining & 
Sugarman 2020: 201)
Towards the end of his time in Belfast during ‘the Troubles’, he became 
involved in public debates about emergency powers and torture, something 
which linked closely with his growing interest in Jeremy Bentham’s 
utilitarianism and normative jurisprudence, that is, questions about 
values such as law and morality, justice, rights and legitimacy. It proved 
an important part of his intellectual journey (Twining 2019: 96-98).
The Queen’s four-year undergraduate degree persuaded William that 
the Achilles’ heel of primary legal education in England and Wales was, 
and remains, the three-year degree for 18-year-olds, and that most of the 
unsatisfactory polemics about legal education have been due to trying to 
squeeze too much into a three-year course. He concluded that: ‘There is 
little hope for undergraduate legal education in UK until four-year degrees 
become the norm’ (Twining & Sugarman 2020: 103).
It was during this period that William was involved in several efforts 
to reform law, legal education and training, including his membership of 
the Armitage Committee on Legal Education in Northern Ireland (1973) 
and submissions to the Law Commission and the Ormrod Committee 
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(1971), the Society of Public Teachers of Law (SPTL)2 and the Statute Law 
Society. 
After six years in Belfast (1966-1972), and together with several 
colleagues from Dar es Salaam, William was presented with the 
opportunity, to help shape a second new law school, this time in the UK. 
William and Geoffrey Wilson had recognized each other as allies since 
their first meeting in 1966. They viewed English legal education as narrow, 
insular and rule-bound. When Wilson was appointed the founding Chair 
at Warwick Law School in 1968, he set about the project of ‘broadening 
law from within’, constructing a curriculum that was both radical for 
the times and exciting (Twining 2019: 147-156). William joined him at 
Warwick in 1972 and immediately became Acting Chair and then Chair 
of the Law School—roles he did not enjoy.
Much of my energy as chairman was devoted to keeping the law 
school running, though not always smoothly … [The] teaching went 
well, research less so. Some of my younger colleagues were more 
interested in micro-politics than serious research: there was even 
a suggestion that research and publication were ‘careerist’, an idea 
quite contrary to … my own ethos … Some saw committee work as a 
source of power (Twining 2019: 151-152).
Having spent a decade at Warwick (1972–1982), William was appointed 
Quain Professor of Jurisprudence at the University of London, based at 
University College London (UCL), from 1983 until 1996 (Twining 2019: 
190-205). After a period as Research Professor, he became Emeritus in 
2004. From the outset, he sought to reconstitute the undergraduate 
and postgraduate programmes at UCL and the London LLM in a more 
innovative, challenging, interdisciplinary fashion, but with mixed results. 
He successfully revamped the undergraduate course on jurisprudence at 
UCL in a way that was progressive; but his efforts to overcome intercollegiate 
rivalry on the LLM ultimately failed. He chaired the Bentham Committee 
(1982–2000) and his main writings on Bentham date from this time. From 
1983 he chaired for almost a decade the Commonwealth Legal Education 
Association. During the same period, he also published extensively on 
legal education, notably his 1994 Hamlyn Lectures, Blackstone’s Tower 
(Twining 1994b). This period also saw the publication of his principal 
work rethinking evidence (Twining 2006)—combining ‘skills’ and ‘context’ 
to transcend traditional rule-based approaches—with the commencement 
of his ‘Globalization and Law’ project (Twining 2000). He continued to 
2 William played a signal role in the transformation of the SPTL from something of a gentleman’s 
Conservative club towards a scholarly society that aims to promote equality, diversity and inclusion 
across legal academia (Cownie & Cocks 2009: 104-109, 124-129, 138, 156-160, 161).
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travel widely and regularly to facilitate his research, as a consultant 
and advisor, in his capacity as a legal education activist and to teach, 
notably, his regular stints of teaching Evidence with Terry Anderson at 
the University of Miami Law School (Twining 2019: 214-216). 
Finally, at UCL, in 1984 William initiated an optional postgraduate 
programme for present and intending law teachers, the Law Teachers 
Programme, that proved much more successful than initially anticipated 
(Twining 2019: 225). Avrom Sherr attended some of William’s lectures, 
which he recollects thus:
An avuncular senior professor appeared at the lectern, as if by magic, 
at the appointed hour, wearing the expected pullover, which might 
have escaped from ‘Xmas festivities. A motley collection of UCL Masters 
students assembled in readiness to learn the secrets of teaching law, 
of teaching anything, and getting a Certificate for Attendance …
The Professor treated them as equals. There would be no exam, 
though there would be some take-away exercises. It would be a mixed 
programme of learning about legal education and learning how to 
do legal education … There would be some readings. There were 
few such courses at that time [and it proved] innovatory. Twining 
invited students to think about their own legal education up till then 
and consider what was good and what was not; who they liked as 
teachers and why; what they thought they might do as teachers. And 
then it gave them an opportunity to write about their thoughts, learn 
about the literature on legal education, and practice a few possible 
approaches which were different from either the lecture or the 
seminar. The atmosphere was somewhere between an Oxford tutorial, 
a Warwick Socratic lecture and afternoon tea with the friendly vicar. 
William was well loved and admired by those students attending; and 
by and large, all had fun (Sherr 2021).
Following his retirement in 1999, William’s scholarly output has 
increased exponentially. He has continued to make important contributions 
to evidence as a multidisciplinary field, legal education, globalization, 
law in general and the de-parochialization of our juristic canon (Twining 
2012). His ‘unfinished agenda’ includes a project on ‘Linguistic Diversity 
and Social Justice’; broadening the concept of ‘legal reasoning’ (or judicial 
reasoning on questions of law); follow-up activities on his ‘Human Rights: 
Southern Voices’ project; and his ongoing involvement in the preservation 
and management of ‘Legal Records at Risk’ (Twining 2019: 259-273). 
PART II 
The picture that emerges from the interviews with William, together 
with his scholarship, is of an intellectual whose reading and sources 
of inspiration are exceptionally eclectic. His writing, like its author, is 
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generous, humane and rational. His analysis tends to be sharp and 
analytical, demanding and challenging. He draws on a range of disciplines 
including intellectual history, educational research, social anthropology, 
psychology, and contemporary ideas about globalization. His ‘gurus’ 
include Italo Calvino, R G Collingwood, Herbert Hart, Karl Llewellyn and 
Jeremy Bentham (Twining & Sugarman 2020: 203-204). 
William’s considerable involvement in legal education reform has 
spanned much of his life. In addition to his initiatives in Khartoum, Dar es 
Salaam, Belfast, Warwick and UCL, he has served as a member of several 
advisory bodies that honed his ideas and extended his experience of the 
politics of legal education reform, while also shaping contemporary debates 
about legal education. Of particular importance is his participation in the 
International Legal Center (ILC) Report, Legal Education in a Changing 
World (ILC 1975). In 1972 the New York-based ILC asked an international 
group of legal scholars, distinguished in part for their contributions to 
legal education in one or more countries in Asia, Africa or Latin America, 
to examine the progress and problems of legal education in those regions 
of the world. The Committee reviewed a considerable body of material and 
delegated the preparation of this report to a five-person task force that 
included William. This opportunity allowed William, in the company of 
an impressive international team, to stand back, draw on his experience 
of legal education on three continents and conjure ‘blue sky thinking’ at 
a time when law and legal education reform was in the air in the UK and 
elsewhere. From its outset the Report warned that it:
may disturb some because its portrayal of the present situation – 
the existing characteristics of legal education in many countries – 
is cast in critical terms, and because it seems to call for a rather 
drastic re-thinking of objectives and methods ... [and] may require a 
‘new breed’ of law teachers who will bring new perspectives and skills 
to the discipline. In spelling out ‘the case for legal education’ the 
report argues the importance of conceiving and developing law as a 
sophisticated discipline with strong links to others, and as a vehicle 
for examining many problems of social change as well as new ideals 
of justice. The report stresses the importance of multi-disciplinary 
research to facilitate better understanding of legal cultures, law and 
the actual workings of the legal system, and it faults legal education 
for the limited scope of most legal research undertaken by law 
teachers today (ILC 1975: 9). 
Membership of the ILC, says William, ‘was a game-changer … During 
the next twenty years I used it as the starting point and framework for 
analysing legal education policy and for several specific projects’ (Twining 
2019: 219). 
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Building on the ILC Report, Blackstone’s Tower advocated a model of 
law schools ‘as multi-purpose centres of learning … as the legal system’s, 
as opposed to the legal profession’s, House of Intellect’—what William 
called ‘the I.L.C.’s model’ (Twining 2019: 54; see further, Twining 1994b: 
52, 58-60, 85, 195-98; cf. Bradney 2003: 76-78)—that is distinctive for 
its diversification of the constituencies that legal education might serve. 
In preparing and delivering Blackstone’s Tower, William knew that the 
Lord Chancellor’s Advisory Committee on Legal Education and Conduct 
(ACLEC) review of legal education and training, on which he served as 
a consultative panel member, was under way and it was partly written 
with the review in his sights. Ambitious in aim although modest in tone, 
Blackstone’s Tower was incisive in its dissection of what is wrong with 
legal education and what needs to be put right. It proved something of a 
milestone. Love or loathe it (Goodrich 1996), it immediately became the 
go-to account of the modern English law school—its history, ambiguous 
role, peculiar culture and, crucially, the model it could and should imbibe. 
ACLEC’s first report reflected important elements of Blackstone’s Tower 
as the foundation for a fundamental reform of legal education and training 
at both the academic and professional stages.3 Yet, like its predecessors 
and successors, the report enjoyed a distinctly qualified success, more 
welcomed in academia (although not without qualification) than by the 
legal profession.4 
William’s involvement in the Legal Education and Training Review 
(LETR) was less high profile (LETR 2013)—although his scholarship 
proved influential, and it is rumoured that he was invited in the final 
stage of the Review to comment on the recommendations. 
Although he regards the report as in some important respects an 
improvement on its predecessors in England and Wales, he has expressed 
dissatisfaction not only about the report and the periodic review process 
in legal education but also the general discourse in the field as a whole. 
Since about 2016 he has begun to develop ideas about how the whole field 
of ‘learning about law’ might be reframed to provide a basis for thinking, 
3 William’s scholarship was expressly used to underpin the views of the Committee: see ACLEC 
(1996) at paragraph 2.5 and note 21; paragraph 2.6 and note 22; paragraph 2.8 and note 25; 
paragraph 3.26 and note 48; paragraph 4.3 and note 51; and paragraph 6.7 and note 90. In his account 
of the ACLEC review, Sir Bob Hepple, a leading member of the Committee, singled out Blackstone’s 
Tower for particular mention, saying that the Committee had benefited from it: Hepple 1996: 470 
note 2. 
4 However, they frequently influence future events and contribute to the ways in which academics 
see their position vis-à-vis the legal profession and vice versa. 
344 Amicus Curiae
Series 2, Vol 2, No 3
research and policy making in the coming years, building on the ILC 
Report (Twining 2014; 2019: 270).
Whilst he stands by most of his detailed arguments on legal education, 
William has begun to address what he regards as a major flaw in his 
own thinking since ‘Pericles and the Plumber’. In essence, he advocates 
a broader conception of ‘legal education’ and of the role of university law 
schools within it than what he terms ‘the primary school model’ of legal 
education: 
Learning about law is lifelong, from cradle to grave, and nearly all 
of that learning is informal in the sense that it takes place outside 
institutionalized ‘formal’ instruction. On the other hand, nearly all 
research, public discourse, debate, and policy making about Legal 
Education has focused on law schools, law teaching, law teachers, 
and law students. To an extraordinary extent, as academic lawyers, 
we have focused obsessively, sometimes narcissistically, on primary 
legal education and initial professional admission to private practice 
– one quite small part of a total picture of formal learning about law, 
let alone learning about law through all of the seven ages of man (and 
belatedly woman) in society as a whole … I am not saying that formal 
primary legal education or law schools are unimportant although 
that might be true in the greater scheme of things ... [But] I now 
want to look at the whole field from a different perspective and set 
particular topics in a much broader context (Twining & Sugarman 
2020: 214, see, further 213-215; Twining 2019: 270-173—this builds 
on William’s earlier work championing ‘law for non-lawyers’ and 
‘public understanding of law’: Twining 2005a; 2009b). 
PART III 
Jurist in Context (JIC) (Twining 2019), William’s rich and detailed 
intellectual memoir, his recent book on General Jurisprudence (Twining 
2009a) and his interview of 2019 (Twining & Sugarman 2020) together 
provide the best entry point to his life and thought, illuminating the 
continuities and changes in his views since Blackstone’s Tower. As I read 
it, JIC argues that ‘much legal scholarship is normative and opinionated 
… partly because it is weak contextually, empirically and theoretically’ 
(Twining 2019: 105), and that theorization, centrally important to the 
health of the discipline of law and socio-legal studies, needs refinement 
on matters such as legal reasoning. William’s theoretical originality and 
importance is illustrated by his application of some of the best facets of 
analytical jurisprudence, Llewelyn-inspired legal realism, legal pluralism 
and perspectives that eschew insularity and Eurocentric universalism. 
In effect, JIC makes the case for the added value that this mix brings to 
socio-legal research and the discipline of law and their ability to respond 
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to the new challenges posed by globalization and the like. This is directly 
related to William’s long-standing crusade to widen and deepen Oxford-
style analytical jurisprudence, and to build a bridgehead between it and 
socio-legal studies, bringing benefit to both sides. Its central theme is that 
all academic lawyers should be concerned with, and take responsibility 
for, the health of our discipline. JIC introduces new audiences to William’s 
ideas and aims to enlist them to the cause of turning the field of law into 
a humanistic discipline.5 
JIC continues William’s efforts to decentre legal doctrine as a core to 
the discipline of law and look seriously at the system as a whole. He 
restates his view that rules are as central to the study of law as they 
are in disciplines which describe and interpret human behaviour, such 
as anthropology, sociology, psychology, or linguistics. However, his idea 
of rules is much wider than ‘legal doctrine’. JIC demonstrates the value 
of the analytical tradition and analytical approaches in the study and 
teaching of law in society. Rather than an adjunct of legal positivism 
and doctrine-centred teaching and scholarship, JIC demonstrates how 
the analytical tradition can play a vital role in transcending the idea that 
legal doctrine delimits or differentiates the discipline of law.
So, where, almost two decades since the publication of Blackstone’s 
Tower, now stands the notion of law as a humanistic discipline with law 
schools as purveyors of humanistic education? 
Academic law in the UK is livelier and more diverse than ever (Cownie 
2004). Law and socio-legal review articles and textbooks have come a long 
way since the 1960s, mostly for the good. Although socio-legal studies 
has yet to become an accepted and established feature of all university 
law schools, it nonetheless is flourishing as never before, exhibiting an 
intellectual self-confidence and ambition which at its best addresses big 
questions of identity and power, for example, on a much greater scale 
than hitherto (Wheeler 2020). Law teachers are not so different from 
other academics in the humanities and social sciences. Postgraduate 
studies have grown overall, and the interdisciplinary turn has constituted 
a ‘dangerous supplement’ to the doctrinal mainstream, whilst fostering 
closer ties between law schools and the rest of the university.
And yet, much of William’s vision remains unfulfilled. As I have argued 
elsewhere (Sugarman 2020), law schools and legal scholarship are still 
overwhelmingly preoccupied with doctrine, case law and the judge-
5 For a succinct overview of, and a critical engagement with, JIC, see Sugarman 2020; Twining & 
Sugarman, 2020.
346 Amicus Curiae
Series 2, Vol 2, No 3
centred model of the legal process, albeit, in an attenuated form. The 
core subjects remain greatly over-represented in the curriculum (Bartie 
2010). The tendency toward organizational, cultural, demographic and 
financial homogeneity within the discipline of law persists, as does its 
dependence on student numbers and tuition income.6 Despite important 
changes since the 1990s, much remains the same. Law schools, like the 
universities and the societies within which they operate, continue to be 
hierarchical and ethnocentric. Importantly, the conditions that sustain 
current models of university legal education have remained constant: 
notably, student demand and finance; the cost of education; and the need 
for legal education to be sufficiently harmonious with the interests of the 
legal profession, of their principal clients, universities and government. 
Innovation in legal education operates within these confines (Gordon 
2002); and most are beyond the control of legal academics (Arthurs 2019: 
136-138). 
The restructuring of universities and academic identities by 
corporatization and commodification has been subject to a welter of 
different interpretations (Collier 2005). Socio-legal studies may have 
benefited more than most other disciplines from the new political economy 
governing academic life (Wheeler 2020), but this is not writ in stone and 
could easily change in the future. 
The alienating tendencies within contemporary higher education 
have been replicated in the legal services industry. Disconcerting 
trends include the McDonaldization, commodification, corporatization, 
excessive specialization and bureaucratic routinization of legal services; 
and the privatization of legal education (Sommerlad & Ors 2015b; 
Sommerlad & Ors 2020; Dunne 2021). Arguably, these trends render 
de facto redundant much of the common platform of legal knowledge 
underpinning academic and profession legal education. Whilst they may 
represent both an opportunity and a threat to the law as humanistic 
model, their consequences for this model have, with notable exceptions 
(such as Tamanaha 2012 and Sommerlad & Ors 2015a) yet to receive 
serious attention. Although fewer law students than ever are entering the 
legal profession, the character and culture of legal practice is important. 
As Robert Gordon observes: 
In the precincts of ordinary law practice, tolerance for anything but 
the most bread-and-butter instrumental approaches to practice is 
at what may be a historic low. Especially in corporate practice, the 
6 On the tendency towards isomorphism and its detrimental impact on US legal education, see 
Coquillette & Kimball 2015; Kimball & Coquillette 2020. 
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stresses of competition and around-the-clock client demands, and the 
extreme pressures to produce profits and billable hours, have created 
a very hostile climate for self-critical reformist lawyers committed to 
reflection on the broader contexts and objectives of practice and the 
long term. The problem of how to remake professional environments 
such as law firms into more hospitable environments for constructive 
‘lawyer-statesmen’ should be high on the profession’s agenda, 
including the legal academy’s. There will not be much point to the law 
schools turning out broad-based and reflective humane professionals 
if all their humane instincts are going to be squashed once they get 
into practice (Gordon 2006: 166).
There remain several branches and niches of professional practice where 
‘broad-based and reflective humane professionals’ may seek fulfilment. 
But the cut-backs in legal aid and state funding of the justice system, the 
curtailment of access to justice, proposed restrictions on judicial review, 
and the ‘culture wars’ demonizing personal injury, human rights and 
allied lawyering have diminished the opportunities for and challenged the 
legitimacy of humane professionalism in legal practice.
Meanwhile, the perennial clash between what students want and expect 
and what their teachers want to give them has probably intensified as 
the financial cost of higher education, the level of student debt, and job 
insecurity have all mushroomed. 
Are law schools principally for producing lawyers; knowledge for its 
own sake (Bradney 2003); useful knowledge; ‘the advancement and 
dissemination of understanding and knowledge about law in all its 
aspects’ (Twining 2005b: 670-671)? Or, is the ultimate goal ‘to cultivate 
humane, independently-minded individuals, alert to the impact of law and 
the legal system on society and involved in reforming them so that they 
operate more effectively and justly’ (Gordon 2006: 158); or, some or none 
of the above? What might be feasible, as distinct from desirable? William’s 
conception of law as a humanistic discipline and of multifunctional law 
schools turns on the achievement of sufficient independence from the 
legal profession and practice-bound LLB students, something law schools 
have yet to actualize.
Given this challenging and paradoxical juncture, a reconsideration 
and re-evaluation of Blackstone’s Tower is timely. How does it speak to 
us today; which of its strengths remain inspirational and relevant; what 
were its blind spots; and how could we do better? If this special issue 
prompts further debate about these questions it will have achieved a 
great deal. 
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